While Hamas' rockets are the current the focus of attention in the Israeli-Arab conflict, Palestinians are not alone in having conducted a campaign of rocket warfare. The Lebanese terrorist organization Hizballah conducted a rocket bombardment of northern Israel during the Second Lebanon War of 2006. From July 13 to August 13 of that year, the Israel Police reported 4,228 rocket impacts inside Israel from rockets fired by Hizballah. No geographical area in the world has sustained such a large quantity of rocket strikes since the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s.

  On January 8, 2009, several rockets launched in Lebanon impacted in Israel.

  As Israel and Egypt exercise a degree of control over the entry of weapons in the Gaza StripWhile Hamas has been limited to indigenously-produced Qassams and relatively small caliber military rockets which can be smuggled through tunnels via Egypt. Hizballah does not suffer from such constraints and benefits from the support of neighboring Syria, with whom it shares a porous border, and Iran. As a result the organization enjoys a steady flow of rockets of various calibers with greater potential lethality than those employed by Hamas.

  Most of rockets fired by Hizballah at Israel were taken from the Syrian arsenal rather than from Iran. On most occasions, the rocket warhead contained anti-personnel munitions, a mixture of explosives and steel balls or fragments that were lethal to all those caught outside. Unlike Hamas in Gaza, Hizballah is not necessarily limited to launching one katyusha missile at a time from improvised static launchers, sometimes consisting of little more than a few boards,but also has truck and trailer mounted multiple rocket launchers.

Hizballah's Rocket Inventory

  The head of Israeli Military Intelligence reported in 2004 that Hezbollah had 13,000 rockets, most with a 25-kilometer range, about 500 with a range of 45 kilometers [Fajr-3] to 75 kilometers [Fajr-5], and a few dozen with a 115-kilometer range [Zelzal-2]. A senior Military Intelligence officer told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee in 2006 that Hizbullah possessed thousands of rockets with a 20-kilometer firing range as well as some 100 rockets capable of reaching targets of 40-70 kilometers. Hezbollah had not used the Fajr rockets until the July 2006 conflict.

  Hizballah's inventory of rockets come primarily from Syria and include:

    Grad-type 122mm Katyusha, range 30 km., warhead 30 kg

    Improved Grad 122mm Katyusha, range 50 km., warhead 30 kg

    220mm rocket," range 70 km (likely Syrian-made Russian "Ouragan" Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS])

    "B302" 302mm rocket, range 100 km, warhead 175 kg. (probably Syrian-manufactured Chinese WS-1 MLRS)

  One-fourth of the rockets that landed within Israel landed within built-up areas. During the first two weeks, rocket attacks averaged about 100 per day. Then in early August, Hizballah proceeded to double its rate of fire to a daily average of 200 rocket attacks. There was a decline during the final week, but on August 13, the day before the cease-fire, 250 rockets landed in Israel. Israeli counterattacks apparently had no serious influence on Hizballah's rate of fire, but had an effect on the accuracy and geography of the attacks.

  Israel's losses and damage from Hizballah rocket attacks include 53 fatalities, 250 severely wounded, and 2,000 lightly wounded. There was extensive damage to hundreds of dwellings, several public utilities, and dozens of industrial plants. One million Israelis lived near or in shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000 civilians evacuating the north and relocating to other areas of the country.

  Early Warning sirens provided timely alarms, saving innumerable lives. Israel's long-standing policy of constructing public shelters, combined with building codes that require reinforced spaces in private dwellings, proved to be generally effective as a system of passive defense against most of the rockets fired by Hizballah. Nearly 80 percent of fatalities involved persons caught in the open.

The Effects of Hizballah's Weapons

  Of the more than four thousand rockets that landed within Israel, three-quarters landed in open areas, but one-fourth (972 - 23 percent) landed within built-up areas. The number of longer-range rockets (50+ km.) fired at Israel was approximately 250.

  Patterns of fire could be discerned during the course of the war. From July 13 to August 1, rocket attacks averaged about 100 per day, with a daily fluctuation from 33 to 145. Then Hizballah proceeded to double its rate of fire. From August 1 to August 7, there was a daily average of 200 rocket attacks, with a range of 160 to 215. Between August 7 and August 13 there was a decline, with the highest daily figure reaching 160. However, on the final day before the cease-fire (August 13), 250 rockets landed in Israel. At one point during the war, Hizballah achieved a rate of fire of approximately 150 rockets per hour. Overall, Israeli counterattacks, while affecting accuracy and deflecting fire from Haifa during the last phases of the war, apparently had no serious influence on Hizballah's rate of fire.

  It was also noted that Hizballah had changed tactics in August, concentrating more rockets at the same target, and repeating attacks on points it had just attacked, as those in the shelters began to emerge after what they believed was a safe interval.

  Israel's losses and damage suffered from Hizballah rocket attacks include 53 fatalities, 250 severely wounded, and approximately 2,000 lightly wounded. There was extensive damage to hundreds of dwellings, several public utilities, and dozens of industrial plants. Some 500 forest and brush fires were caused by rocket impacts. One million Israelis had to stay near or in shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000 civilians evacuating the north and relocating to other areas of the country. Most economic activity in northern Israel was suspended for a month.

Advanced Aerial Weapons

  Hizballah's intereset in aerial weapons is not limited to rockets. The organization has flown remotely-controlled drones over Israel on at least tweo occasions and may be interested in building do-it-yourself cruise missiles a la the Qassam rocket.

  An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) believed to be an Iranian made Mirsad-1 (Observer) operated by Hizballah entered Israeli airspace on November 7, 2004. It flew at a low altitude over Nahariya, then turned west towards the Mediterranean, turned again to the north and crashed into the sea near the Lebanese shore. The UAV, a reconnaisance vehicle, flew in Israeli airspace for nearly thirty minutes unopposed.>

Iranian images of the UAV over Israel

  Despite the fact that the UAV (likely an Iranian-built Mirsad-1) took no overtly hostile actions, the incident created a wave of anxiety in Israel the incident was widely reported both in Israel and internationally.

Iranian television images of the UAV which flew over Israel

  On April 11,2005, a second Hizballah UAV penetrated Israeli airspace and flew over the northern town of Nahariya for fifteen minutes. The UAV returned to Lebanese airspace before IDF aircraft could intercept it. The incidents raised serious questions about Israel's air defenses. Currently no country has an efficient defense against small l UAVs flying at low altitudes. Typically, anti-aircraft defenses are intended to detect and destroy larger, high-speed aircraft.

  It is believed that Iran supplied Hezbollah with 8 such drones some 30 Hizballah terrorists received UAV flight control training at aRevolutionary Guards' base near Isfahan.

  Hizballah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah boasted about acquiring the drones, saying that the drone "can be laden with a quantity of explosives, 40 to 50 kilograms" and reach "anywhere, deep, deep" into Israel. He further claimed that the UAVs had been built by his organization though that is likely propaganda and intended to shield Iran from additional pressure from the international community. UAVs can become a very attractive option for terrorists hoping to strike point targets or deliver chemical or biological weapons. Another advantage is that an explosive-laden UAV sould strike a target in an area denied to suicide bombers.

  In the 20th Century, guerrilla warfare was a derivative of state vs. state conflict largely due to the dependence of guerrilla groups on nation-states for weapons (or, more accurately, the manufacturing capability necessary to make them). That dependency is rapidly declining as:

  Vast quantities of mothballed Cold War hardware continues to find new uses. Grey market manufacturing becomes increasingly available (down to low-cost knock-offs) from a growing number of sources.

  DIY (do-it-yourself) weapons, built from scratch using off the shelf parts/knowledge/tools and produced in quantity through cottage industry at low cost, emerge (IEDs, Qassam Rockets, Storm worm, etc.). It is surprising what can be done with only a shoestring budget.

  Due to the human ingenuity DIY weapons are improving in lethality or effectiveness much more quickly than state-developed weapons. A regular military organization must recognize the need for a new item, then develop requirements, call for proposals from defense contractors, wait until the contractors develop prototypes for evaluation, and evaluate the entries. Only after choosing the best prototype will the go ahead for production be given, All of this takes time. When a terrorist or insurgent, on the other hand,comes up with an idea he goes ahead and builds it. If it works a "how to" tutorial will quickly appear on the Internet and the innovation spreads quickly. Unfortunately, DIY weapons and the organizational processes necessary to take advantage of it have been vastly accelerated by the catalyst of Iraq. DIY weapons are now a major factor in the global jihad, made worse by an ability to improve at rates 20 times faster than what we saw with groups of similar size late in the last century.

  DIY weapons will likely become ever more prevalent in the future as innovators branch out into new areas and begin to take advantage of newly emerging capabilities. Amateur hackers, tinkerers, and inventors can pursue more paths of discovery and development simultaneously than large, expensive, and linear development efforts. For example: personal fabrication that can churn out rockets/UAVs with tight form factors and customized/integrated flight systems -- or -- bioengineered pathogens that use commonly available materials, university sequencing/design software, widely available skills, and labs on a chip. The only limiting factor are the imaginations of terorists and insurgents.

  In contrast, the big defense contractors will find themselves focused increasingly on developing anti-weapons to counter DIY innovation.

DIY Rockets

  We can see an early example of this trend in weapons development with the IED (improvised explosive device) which has migrated from a tactical device to an operational (operational art is between tactics and strategy) weapon. Another weapon that may follow a similar path of development is the DIY (do it yourself) rocket. Although it is early days, the writing is on the wall. DIY rockets are inexpensive ($500 to $2000 currently). Easy to store and quick to launch (they require less set-up time than IEDs). In terms of effects, they convey the message (despite the current inaccuracy) that no place is safe for civilian supporters of a war effort. It can also be used to destroy economic activity in affected areas. For example, the Israeli town of Sderot, which has suffered an increasing number of DIY Rocket attacks in recent years:

  About 4000 of the town's 23,500 people have moved out in the past two years, according to municipal figures. Many more say they would leave if they could... Home prices have fallen by 50 per cent... 20-30 per cent of businesses in Sderot and surrounding areas have shut down... Overall sales at the stores that remain open have dropped by nearly 50 per cent...

  Given this example, it's clear that terrorists employing DIY rockets can cause tremendous economic dislocation. Further, if combined with a defensive hedgehog, the conventional forces of the state under attack may be forced to make relatively ineffectual and harried strikes on fleeting targets, creating the collateral damage so useful to an insurgency.

  We can expect these DIY efforts to get steadily better as new amateur tech (tinkering networks) adds increasing levels of sophistication (from range to accuracy). Here's a great example of low cost design software from RocketSim ADD LINK. Basic avionics. Here's a nice system that adds telemetry and inertial/GPS measurement. As a capper, here's potentially a platform play in open source avionics for rockets. The last step, a control system connected to servo based vanes is all that is needed to enable it to hit specific buildings. That's hard, but well within the capabilities we see emerging in the tinkering space.

  Though Hizballah UAVs are of Iranian origin, accomplished model aircraft hobbyists are capable of building fairly large aircraft which could serve as reconnaisance vehicles or even carry explosive payloads. All the components and associated equipment are inexpensive and available on the open market. The model B-52 bomber seen below has eight operating jet engines and weighs well over three hundred pounds when fully fueled. Add a GPS or other guidance system and you have yourself a "cruise missile."

Beqaa Valley Aircraft Industry?

  After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States a retired New Zealand engineer became worried that terrorists would be capable of constructing and using a cruise missile. To prove the point he decided to build one. Cost of the missile would be limited to US$ 5,000 and would be constructed solely of materials easily obtainable from local sources or through the mail. Along with the airframe and guidance systems he designed a jet engine which could be built in any well-equipped machine shop.

  The vehicle was constructed primarily from expanded polystyrene foam and fiberglass resin which would have greatly reduced its radar return signature. Expected airspeed was approximately five hundred mph with a range of at least fifty miles, which could be extended.

  The project attracted much attention, including offers from Iran and southern Lebanon to purchase the plans for the cruise missile and the engine. US Government officials stated that the effort, "was not helpful," and the government of New Zealand forced the builder to shut down the project and put the missile into hiding before he could test fly it.

The cruise missile under construction

The assembled guidance system

Build-it-yourself jet engine

  It is not just cruise missiles that can be built by hobbyists, if Hizballah's supply of missiles from Iran and Syria were to be cut off, it is not beyond the realm of possibility for the terrorists to contruct large rockets on their own.

  High power rocketry hobbyists in the United States build and fly very large model rockets, as much as thirty feet long. The rockets are so large they have military-syle TELs (transporter erector launcher). The current altitude record for these vehicles is approximately one hundred thousand feet.

  While al-Ghoul Dot Com has no information that Hizballah is currently involved in constructing rockets or cruise missiles in Lebanon, that it can be done does not bode well for the future; for Israel or other countries engaged in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency.

  Fortunately, some Israeli leaders seem to be aware of the threat posed by DIY weapons. On January 12, 2009, Hamas raided some 100 aid trucks that Israel had allowed into Gaza, stole their contents and sold them to the highest bidders. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has forbidden the entry of electronic devices to Gaza, including computers, infra-red cameras, and microwave ovens; all of which can be used to produce weapons.